From AUKUS to CAUKUS: The Case for Canadian Integration
In September 2021 the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States announced a new security partnership: AUKUS. The aspect which has received most attention is the provision for the U.K. and the U.S. to help Australia acquire and operate nuclear-powered submarines.
But this is only the first of the agreement’s two pillars. Pillar II includes cooperation on advanced cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, undersea capabilities, hypersonic missiles and counter-hypersonic missile technology, electronic warfare, and wider innovation and information sharing.
While some aspects of Pillar II are still unclear, it is likely to become a major driving force behind innovation in this field. Canada would greatly benefit from joining what would be the world’s most advanced partnership on defence technology and would thus guarantee its position as a key player in Western defence. But AUKUS too would be strengthened by bringing in Canada. Canada’s geography, advanced technological sectors, particularly AI and quantum computing, and its integration with the U.S. significantly complement AUKUS objectives. This report therefore recommends enlarging Pillar II to include Canada.
Canada’s own ambition to further develop critical mineral mining and processing infrastructure is an additional factor. It is in the enviable position of having large reserves of the most critical minerals and the industry to extract, process, manufacture and recycle them. Enhancing collaboration on these critical minerals would ensure greater resilience of AUKUS supply chains and reduce dependence on non-allied sources, notably China. Securing critical minerals supply chains should be a priority for AUKUS members. This report therefore recommends introducing tariff and quota free trade in critical minerals among all members of the agreement.
Despite these positive prospects, there are challenges to the successful development of Pillar II, notably ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations), the U.S. regulatory regime which restricts the transfer of controlled defence articles and services. AUKUS, in contrast to ITAR, hinges on the assumption that a select group of allies should be trusted and therefore not subject to the same regulations as all other states. The report therefore recommends legislating to allow the free flow of defence articles between all AUKUS members.
Summary of recommendations:
Expand AUKUS Pillar II to include Canada.
Ensure the security of supply of critical minerals and commit to tariff and quota-free trade in critical minerals among AUKUS members.
Revise ITAR to allow the free flow of defence articles among all AUKUS members.
Encourage legislators in AUKUS member countries to maintain pressure on their respective governments to keep up momentum on the issue.